Churchill and the Dardenelles

Revision as of 14:34, 19 December 2010

   To what extent do these documents support Churchill’s claim that the Dardanelles campaign was not ‘a civilian plan foisted by a political amateur upon reluctant officers and experts’?

Examining the wider context of the Dardanelles campaign, the objective was to break the deadlock in the wider prosecution of the war especially in Flanders where causalities were unacceptably high. Churchill summed up this sentiment “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders” (Jenkins P255). Two new strategies two were seriously discussed. One was an invasion through The Baltics. The alternative route, that took preference, was one through the Dardanelles. When this decision was made Churchill was part of a War Council and that included politicians and military personnel such as Kitchener He was also the head of the Admiralty that included the experienced yet elderly, Fisher. In his resignation speech he says the plan “was made by naval authorities on the spot and approved by naval experts ” As strong willed as Churchill was, he was still relatively young and it’s unlikely that he could unilaterally persuade his military colleagues to carry out a plan which was doomed to fail. Equally, Asquith, although not a military tactician, was shrewd enough to not allow this operation to move forward against serious military opposition had it emerged. In fact he could have used his position to get clear commitment to the plan from others. Nevertheless, we learn the War Council was not a cohesive group and that decision-making was made against a back drop of a continually changing set of events and opinions that makes it difficult to find clear evidence in support of Churchill’s statement . Of the two main military personnel, Kitchener and Fisher were largely ambivalent and capricious, respectively. Best (p65) quotes notes that Kitchener was an early advocate in order to avoid a disaster on the Russian front. Best quotes Gilbert that it was the Admiralty and not Kitchener’s War office who had the authority to plan and conduct the war and he threw the burden of responsibility upon Churchill’s Admiralty. Fisher also initially supported the operation but would later say ‘Damn the Dardanelles. They’ll be our grave’.(Jenkins P263) Although, his analysis may have been correct his increasing mental instability obscured any objectivity and his opinions were given less credence. The falling support for the Dardanelles plan was not so much due to the plan itself but its execution and its early failures. It started as purely a naval operation. The force was ill-equipped and failure to clear the seaway led to a change in tactics that eventually led to an ill-feted expeditionary force. In his Memorandum to the Cabinet August 15th and his later resignation speech Churchill’s explanation was that now the purely naval operation had been abandoned , the Admiralty (and by inference himself)had played a secondary role in the continued planning of the operation. This is slightly tendentious as he seems to suggest that at the same time he did not foist the plan on his colleagues yet by implication he is criticizing them for not following a plan devised by or with him “the situation is now entirely changed and I am not called upon to offer any advice on its new aspects”. He says that the Admirals believed in the plan but omits in his resignation speech that they “ were and still are confident of success” The documents do largely back up Churchill’s statement although they are a little self-serving. Despite the merits of the failed to gain the support needed to push it through ‘Everyone was out of step but Churchill’ (Jenkins 264) and failed to explicitly solicit views of those who might be opposed in the Admiralty or elsewhere.